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Cultural	Influences	Impact	Social	Networking	on	Chinese	Students	Studying	in	
the	United	States	
	
INTRODUCTION	
 It is widely agreed that social	networking	is	one	of	the	most	popular	methods	
of	communication	in	today’s	world.		One	of	the	world’s	most	prevalent	and	popular	
social	networking	sites	(hereinafter	SNS)	is	Facebook;		“Facebook	holds	about	130	
million	active	users,	and	it	is	the	fourth	most	trafficked	website	in	the	world”	1.		
According	to	Mike	Sachoff	and	a	new	survey	from	Prompt	Communications,	
“Facebook	is	now	the	most	popular	communication	tool,	followed	by	SMS	and	
email.2	”	“Facebook,	Inc.	operates	as	a	social	networking	company	worldwide.	The	
company	builds	tools	that	enable	users	to	connect,	share,	discover,	and	
communicate	with	each	other;	enables	developers	to	build	social	applications	on	
Facebook	or	to	integrate	their	websites	with	Facebook;	and	offers	products	that	
enable	advertisers	and	marketers	to	engage	with	its	users.	As	of	February	2,	2012,	it	
had	845	million	monthly	users	and	443	million	daily	users.	3”	
																																																								
1	Dunn,	Haley	B.	"Facebook	&	Other	Social	Networking	Sites:	Candy‐	Coating	Surveillance."	
Commentary:	The	University	of	New	Hampshire	Student	Journal	of	Communication,	2008.	Web.	30	
Jan.	2012.	<http://www.unh.edu/communication/media/pdf/commentary/spring09.pdf#page=89>.	
2	Sachoff,	Mike.	"Survey	Finds	Facebook	Most	Popular	Communication	Tool."	WebProNews.	
WebProNews/Business,	11	Dec.	2009.	Web.	28	Feb.	2012.	<http://www.webpronews.com/survey‐
finds‐facebook‐most‐popular‐communication‐tool‐2009‐12>	
3	"Company	Overview	of	Facebook,	Inc."	Bloomberg	Business	Week.	Web.	3	Mar.	2012.	
	Many	individuals	have	readily	adapted	to	use	this	form	of	communication	media,	
however	there	are	countries	that	restrict	their	citizens’	level	of	access	to	certain	
websites,	and	Facebook	is	a	primary	target.		
	 The	Reporters	Without	Borders	group	has	published	its	annual	list	of	
	 "internet	enemies"	that	it	considers	unfairly	restrict	internet	freedom.	
	 Censorship,	harassment,	lack	of	freedom	of	expression	and	repression	of	
	 bloggers	are	all	mentioned	as	reasons	for	a	country	being	on	the	"roll	of	
	 shame.	Overall	13	countries	have	been	collated	including	China,	Egypt,	
	 Tunisia,	Saudi	Arabia	and	North	Korea.	In	addition	the	group	noted	
	 censorship	in:	Belarus,	Burma,	Cuba,	Syria,	Turkmenistan,	Uzbekistan	and	
	 Vietnam.	4				
In	doing	so	these	countries,	and	China	specifically,	continue	to	impose	limitations	
upon	their	citizen’s	access	to	the	World	Wide	Web,	and	censors	their	ability	to	
readily	communicate	on	an	international	basis.		Further,	these	countries	impose	
restrictions	on	the	information	that	can	be	posted	and	shared	online,	including	
social	network	sites	and	companies	such	as	RenRen	in	China,	which	operate	under	
restrictions	and	monitoring	imposed	by	the	Government.		Social	networking	has	
become	an	important	method	for	communication	and	information	sharing,	because	
it	enables	information	to	easily	be	shared	and	made	available	to	millions	of	online	
users.	
	 Use	of	online	social	networking	in	China	is	at	its	highest	percentage	of	
																																																																																																																																																																					
<http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=20765463	
03‐51‐46‐dare4more.tumblr.gif>.	
	
4	"List Released of Countries That Restrict Web Access." Informed. Ihotdesk, 7 Nov. 2006. Web. 
<Lhttp://www.ihotdesk.com/article/17919092/List%20released%20of%20countries%20that%20restrict%2
0web%20access>.	
participation	among	college	and	high	school	students,	and	use	is	continuing	to	grow	
and	expand	to	other	age	groups.		Chinese	college	students	predominantly	use	
RenRen,	commonly	known	as	China’s	Facebook,	as	their	social	networking	site	
because	the	usage	of	Facebook	is	banned	in	China5	6.	However,	when	Chinese	
students	enter	the	United	States	and	are	immersed	in	this	country’s	foreign	culture,	
they	have	the	opportunity	to	encounter	and	experience	different	online	social	
systems	that	operate	more	openly	with	limited	legal	restrictions	and	little	
government	intervention,	such	as	Facebook.	It	is	the	hypothesis	of	this	research	
report	that	the	combination	of	American	cultural	influence	and	the experience	of	
using	a	SNS		that	is	free	of	government	restriction	regarding	posted	and	shared	
information	will	affect	and	change	the	participants’	online	behavior(s).	This	study	
will	survey	and	investigate	the	on‐line	habits	of	Chinese	students	who	have	been	
living	and	studying	at	Union	College	for	at	least	six	months,	and	will	compare	their	
primary	usage	of	the	Social	Networks	RenRen	and	Facebook.		This	research solicits	
self‐provided	responses,	of	Chinese	students	attending	Union	College,	to	a	
questionnaire	designed	to	answer	questions	like:		do	they	believe	feel	their	SNS	
behavior	has	changed?	If	so,	then	has	their	sense	of	community	or	social	network	
changed?	This	study	considers	the	reasons	they	choose	to	use	one	network	over	the	
other,	if	they	serve	different	purposes,	and	how	frequently	they	visit	Facebook	
and/or	RenRen.	Lastly,	how	aware	are	the	students	of	cultural	and	political	factors	
																																																								
5	Pesek, William. "Mark Zuckerberg and the 'friending' of China." Brisbane Times. National Times, 27 
Feb. 2012. Web. 29 Feb. 2012. <http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/opinion/mark-zuckerberg-and-the-
friending-of-china-20120226-1tw90.html>.	
6	. CHAO, LORETTA. "Mr. Zuckerberg Goes to China." The Wall Street Journal. Dow Jones & Company, 
23 Dec. 2010. Web. 29 Feb. 2012. 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703814804576035143409583806.html>.	
that	influence	their	use	of	SNS?		The	results	of	this	study	anticipate	that	the	
surveyed	Chinese	students	are	active	Facebook	users	who	have	change	their	online	
behavior,	now	that	they	are	afforded	the	opportunity	to	become	part	of	an	online	
community	where	they	can	provide	online	information	and	post	more	openly	on	
Facebook	than	on	RenRen,	because	there	is	an	absence	of	governmental	control	and	
censorship. Additionally,	“while	the	Internet	is	notorious	for	its	digital	dens	of	
deception,	on	Facebook,	what	you	see	tends	to	be	what	you	get…online	social	
networks	are	so	popular	and	so	likely	to	reveal	people’s	actual	personalities	because	
they	allow	for	social	interactions	that	feel	real	in	many	ways;7”	this	supports	the	
claim	that	Facebook	users	freely	express	themselves	by	providing	real	personal	
information.	 
 
LIMITATIONS	
	 Limitations	to	this	study	consist	of	the	lack	of	previous	research	on	social	
networking,	especially	studies	comparing	the	networks	RenRen	and	Facebook,	and	
while	I	would	have	liked	to	personally	interview	each	participant,	time	and	
academic	constraints	unfortunately	dictate	that	the	best	method	to	conduct	the	
survey	is	to	distribute	a	questionnaire	via	email	to	twenty	Chinese	exchange	
students	currently	attending	Union	College.	 	
	 Additionally,	having	lived	in	China	for	six	months,	I	have	limited	but	
																																																								
7	Bower, Bruce. "Facebook Users Are the Real Thing." JSTOR. Science News, 2010. Web. 29 Feb. 2012. 
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/25656111?&Search=yes&searchText=facebook&list=hide&searchUri=%2Fac
tion%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dfacebook%26gw%3Djtx%26acc%3Don%26prq%3Dadvantages%2
Bto%2Bfacebook%26Search%3DSearch%26hp%3D25%26wc%3Don&prevSearch=&item=9&ttl=559&re
turnArticleService=showFullText>.	
previous	exposure	to	aspects	of	Chinese	culture	and	traditions,	and	feel	
somewhat	biased	in	my	predictions	of	what	I	expect	this	research	to	reveal.	My	
time	in	China	was	a	wonderful	experience,	yet	there	were	two	instances	during	
my	stay	where	I	felt	the	impact	of	the	government’s	online	censorship	power	and	
control.	One	illustrative	example	was	this	past	summer	when	I	worked	as	an	
intern	for	IBM	at	their	China	Research	Lab	in	Beijing.		At	the	lab	I	was	supervised	
by	the	psychology	department	and	asked	to	research	privacy	management	issues	
on	SNSs	in	China	and	the	United	States.	This	assignment	involved	the	need	to	
conduct	research	regarding	Facebook	and	its	offered	privacy	tools	and	features,	
and	it	was	necessary	to	access	Facebook.	Originally,	I	thought	I	would	have	no	
problem	accessing	Facebook	even	in	China,	because	I	was	working	for	a	famous	
international	company	conducting	research	in	an	attempt	to	understand	the	
online	populations	better,	and	learn	the	reasons	behind	“user”	privacy	behaviors.		
However,	I	was	unable	to	access	Facebook	through	any	of	the	proxy	outlets	that	I	
was	given	at	IBM,	and	if	I	hadn’t	previously	been	to	China	and	through	Union	
College	installed	a	“Cisco	Any	Connect	VPN	Client”	(VPN),	then	I	would	not	have	
been	able	to	access	Facebook	and	conduct	my	research.		This	was	quite	a	shock	
to	me	that	an	American	company	like	IBM	could	not	have	their	China	based	
operations	access	Facebook.		I	thought,	“who	(at	home)	would	believe	the	
Chinese	government	has	so	much	control	over	the	media?”	Facebook	is	not	
readily	accessible	in	China	because	it	will	not	agree	to	the	prohibitions	over	
information	sharing	and	governmental	monitoring	required	to	operate	in	China.	
Therefore,	the	Chinese	government	has	refused	to	permit	Facebook	from	being	
used	in	China.			
“Mr.	Zuckerberg	has	expressed	interest	in	the	China	market,	though	
he	notes	that	it	is	a	market	that	“is	extremely	complex	and	has	its	own	
dynamics,”	and	noted	there	are	only	four	countries	where	“Facebook	
isn’t	yet	or	on	a	path	to	win:	China,	South	Korea,	Japan,	and	Russia.”	
He	also	observed	that	while	“Facebook	values	openness	it	has	made	
exceptions	in	some	markets	including	Germany	and	Pakistan,	where	
Nazi	content	and	depictions	of	Muhammad	are	seen	as	offensive	and	
are	outlawed.	Mr.	Zuckerberg	also	expressed	the	desire	to	find	a	way	
to	enter	China	“on	our	terms,”	an	idea	that	hasn’t	worked	out	so	well	
for	other	foreign	Internet	companies8. 	
	 This	experience,	along	with	a	situation	when	I	was	at	Fudan	University	in	
Shanghai,	and	attempted	to	check	employment	opportunities	with	the	Central	
Intelligence	Agency,	made	me	feel	censored.		Immediately	after	researching	the	CIA	
website,	I	came	to	realize	that	my	internet	server	was	suddenly	frozen	and	all	my	
computer	functions	became	paralyzed	for	ten	minutes;	a	demonstration	of	the	
internet	control	the	Chinese	government	exercises,	and	of	the	“cyber	police’s”	
activity	monitoring	my	web	search.		“There	are	as	many	as	30,000	in	one	estimate,	
of	cyber	police	squads	patrolling	Chinese	cyberspace,	deleting	politically	incorrect	
content	in	real	time,	blocking	websites,	monitoring	networking	activities	of	citizens	
and	tracking	down	and	arresting	offending	individuals”9.		I	suspect	that	my	CIA	
research	flagged	their	attention.		Research	findings	show	that	while	the	creation	of	
the	internet	has	provided	individuals	in	China	with	a	means	to	communicate,	
distribute	information,	and	even	make	public	statements,	it	simultaneously	has	
																																																								
8	Chao, Loretta, and Yoli Zhang. "Zuckerberg in China: Huzzahs from Users, Hush from Alibaba." Wall 
Street Journal. China Real Time Report, 2010. Web. 05 Mar. 2012. 
<http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/12/23/zuckerberg-in-china-huzzahs-from-users-hush-from-
alibaba/>.	
9	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
given	the	Chinese	government	the	ability	to	monitor	its	citizens’	online	activities	in	
their	efforts	to	maintain	a	social	order	that	coincides	with	their	Communist	Party	
worldview10.		
LITERATURE	REVIEW	
	 China’s	Internet	media	has	advanced	at	a	rapid	pace	since	its	implementation	
in	the	1990’s,	when	China	and	its	citizens	went	from	having	little	contact	with	the	
outside	world,	to	engaging	in	the	global	market,	where	they	were	introduced	to	
electronic	media	products	and	services	like	social	network	sites,	mobile	telephones,	
i‐Pods,	and	the	world	wide	web;	products	which	interested	many	people.	“The	mass	
media	serves	as	a	system	for	communicating	messages	and	symbols	to	the	general	
populace.	It	is	their	function	to	muse,	entertain,	and	inform,	and	to	inculcate	
individuals	with	the	values,	beliefs,	and	codes	of	behavior	that	will	integrate	them	
into	the	institutional	structures	of	the	larger	society”11.		As	China’s	economy	began	
its	transition	into	a	modern	market,	this	function	became	more	attractive	as	its	
government	grew	fearful	its	citizens	would	develop	knowledge	and	information	that	
might	empower	them	to	revolt	or	undermine	the	Communist	Party’s	campaigns,	
ideas,	and	mandate	to	rule12.		For	example,	the	Chinese	government	was	so	
concerned	about	loss	of	power	in	2003,	when	Rupert	Murdoch,	media	expert,	
“pronounced	that	satellite	television	would	bring	the	end	to	authoritarian	regimes	
																																																								
10	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
11	Herman, Edward, and Noam Chomsky. "Media and Cultural Studies." A Propaganda Model (2001): 
280-306. Print.	
12	Chung, Jongpil, and Kyung Hee University Research Fund. "Comparing Online Activities in China and 
South Korea." The Internet and the Political Regime 48.5 (2008): 727-51. Print.	
everywhere,	that	they	(Chinese	government)	had	him	coach	the	top	Chinese	leaders	
at	the	Central	Party	School	in	Beijing	on	how	to	calculatedly	liberalize	the	Chinese	
media	market	for	domestic	and	global	capital,	ensuring	them	that	the	potential	of	
the	open	market	doesn’t	represent	any	loss	of	power.13”	Due	to	this	worry	of	losing	
power	and	the	corresponding	intensified	effort	to	control	media	access	and	
dissemination	of	information,	the	struggle	for	control	continues	today.				
	 The	Chinese	government	regularly	takes	advantage	of	the	media	and	
manages	the	media	by	manipulating	them	(the	“media	giant”	companies)	into	
following	a	special	agenda	and	framework	that	coincides	with	the	government’s	
standards14.		Not	only	does	the	government	exercise	its	authority	by	influencing	
media	based	businesses	into	complying	with	their	commands,	including	
management	of	internet	sites,	but	they	also	impose	party	propaganda	disciplines	on	
individuals	who	criticize	the	Communist	Party	committee.		In	fact,	since	the	Chinese	
government	has	seen	such	great	success	in	managing	media	production	and	
distribution,		“the	party	has	been	able	to	strengthen	the	structural	management	of	
the	media	through	specialized	government	agencies.”15		The	Chinese	government	
monitors	all	internet	content	and	restricts	on‐line	journalists	from	writing	about	
																																																								
13	Zhao, Yuezhi, and Robert A. Hackett. "Democratizing Global Media." Who Want Democracy and Does 
It Deliver Food? Communication and Power in a Globally Integrated China: 57-75. Print.	
14	Herman, Edward, and Noam Chomsky. "Media and Cultural Studies." A Propaganda Model (2001): 
280-306. Print.	
15	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
issues	regarding	human	rights,	democracy,	or	freedom	of	belief,	in	order	to	ensure	
the	stability	of	their	communist	society	and	avoid	potential	threats16.	
	 	The	Chinese	government	maintains	control	over	the	nation’s	media	
networks,	and	the	flow	of	information	made	available	to	its	people.	Because	much	of	
the	media’s	information	is	regulated,	several	websites	are	customized	or	censored.	
“Citizens	have	come	to	realize	that	there	are	forbidden	topics	in	domestic	media	
such	as	press	freedom	and	China’s	suppression	of	this	liberal	aspiration,”	which	are	
not	to	be	dialogued	or	researched17.		In	effect,	if	on‐line	users	“dare	to	communicate	
unsanctioned	information	and	promote	dissenting	ideas,	then	they	are	prosecuted	
under	the	criminal	offences	of	‘disclosing	state	secrets,’	inciting	to	subvert	state	
power”,	and	“endangering	national	security.”18		It	is	this	fear	of	being	monitored	and	
potentially	prosecuted	that	may	explain	why	many	Chinese	users	censor	their	
behavior	online	and	self‐impose	restrictions.		
	 Many	online	users,	including	journalists,	are	well	aware	that	they	can	receive	
jail	sentences,	be	physically	harmed,	and	be	subjected	to	harassment	if	they	publicly	
write	or	speak	about	any	sort	of	politically	incorrect	remark(s).		While	most	citizens	
suffer	in	silence	and	long	to	speak	out	freely,	others	have	risked	punishment	and	
retribution,	some	even	sacrificed	their	lives	in	the	attempt	to	report	sensitive	news	
																																																								
16	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
17	Zhao, Yuezhi, and Robert A. Hackett. "Democratizing Global Media." Who Wants Democracy and Does 
It Deliver Food? Communication and Power in a Globally Integrated China: 57-75. Print.	
18	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
topics,	which	usually	means	politically	based	news	content19.	“On	the	ground,	the	
police	and,	increasingly,	thugs	hired	by	local	authorities	detain	and	obstruct	
reporters,	confiscate	[journalists]	audio	and	videotapes,	and	harass	or	even	beat	
them	when	they	try	to	interview	protesters.”20		The	government	has	and	will	
continue	to	use	punitive	measures	in	order	to	silence	negative	information	or	
criticism	pertaining	to	the	CCP	and	the	Government.	In	order	to	diminish	the	
negative	information	flow	on	the	web,	the	Chinese	government	has	created	a	list	of	
categories	that	are	prohibited	by	anyone	from	being	disclosed;	if	individuals	do	
publish	such	information	they	can	expect	to	suffer	consequences,	some	potentially	
severe.		For	example,	topics	like:	protests,	gathering	of	the	masses,	undermining	
social	stability,	disturbing	social	order,	demonstrations,	etc.	are	all	forbidden	from	
being	published	online21.		
The	Chinese	government	wants	to	regulate	and	manage	the	largest	
social	groups	in	its	country;	therefore,	they	are	less	interested	in	
regulating	the	elite’s	Internet	access	due	to	the	fact	that	China’s	
population	mostly	consists	of	the	lower	and	middle	classes22.		The	
government	wants	to	make	sure	“that	the	vast	majority	of	citizens	do	
not	get	unfiltered	access.	Communication	has	never	simply	been	
about	an	issue	of	free	expression.	It	has	always	been	an	integral	part	
of	political	organization	and	social	mobilization.23		
	
	
																																																								
19	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
20	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
21	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
22	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
23	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
The	lower	class	makes	up	the	largest	portion	of	China’s	people	and	subsequently	
they	are	a	target	group	of	concern	regarding	use	of	the	Internet.		The	government	
monitors	every	facet	of	the	Internet	and	prevents	access	to	uncensored	information;	
“Facebook	is	also	blocked	inside	China,	due	to	government	concerns	that	the	social	
networking	system	could	be	a	portal	for	Chinese	citizens	to	see	a	different	way	of	
life	and	thus	disrupt	"social	harmony.24"		
	 On	the	other	hand,	they	use	the	fundamental	tool	of	“vagueness”	to	instill	
uncertainty	and	fear	in	its	users,	adding	self‐censorship	to	their	word	of	
control25.		“There	are	four	principal	advantages	the	government	gains	with	this	
policy	of	“vagueness:”	(1)	the	potential	of	facing	vague	accusations	to	intimidate	
people	(internet	users)	into	moderating	their	behavior,	(2)	subtle	but	effective	
pressure	causes	many	people	to	control	their	behavior	to	a	greater	extent,	(3)	
being	vague	is	“useful	in	maximizing	what	can	be	learned	during	forced	
confessions,”	and	(4)	it	allows	authorities	to	zero	in	on	whomever	they	want.26”		
One	may	argue	that	these	principals	of	control	play	a	prominent	role	to	the	
degree	that	citizens	have	an	“online	fear‐factor”	about	the	government,	which	in	
turn	inhibits	them	from	disclosing	all	types	of	information	online.	While	China	
has	one	of	the	fastest	growing	economies	in	the	world,	it	is	still	very	clear	it	
“holds	one	of	the	most	oppressive	regimes	in	using	coercive	state	powers	to	
																																																								
24	Eaton, Kit. "Zuckerberg's Taking Facebook Into China, But It'll Be a Baidu Beast | Fast Company." 
FastCompany.com. 11 Apr. 2011. Web. 05 Mar. 2012. <http://www.fastcompany.com/1746392/facebook-
china-baidu-social-networking>.	
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control	public	communication”27.			What’s	more,	this	is	occurring	during	a	time	of	
accelerated	capitalistic	style	development,	where	China	and	its	people	are	
evermore	frequently	facing	ideological	conflicts	over	tradition	and	culture,	
societal	norms,	and	political	ideals.		 
	 Chinese	citizens,	and	in	particular	social	networking	users,	typically	don’t	
disclose	personal	thoughts	or	information	online	due	to	fear	of	losing	their	Internet	
privileges	and	of	being	identified	as	one	of	the	government’s	“targets”	for	Internet	
surveillance,	where	they	can	be	subjected	to	punitive	actions;	“most	users	are	
unwilling	to	express	their	feelings	about	the	party	or	the	government	on‐and‐offline	
due	to	officials’	threats	of	harsh	punishment.28”	Due	to	the	evolution	of	the	Internet	
and	technology,	when	a	person	does	attempt	to	produce	online	sensitive	content,	
they	face		
…”increasing	sophisticated	firewalls	and	filtering	software,	where	the	
survival	time	for	offensive	content	in	cyberspace	has	been	reduced	
from	thirty	minutes	to	just	a	few.		In	December	of	2004,	China’s	
General	Agency	of	Press	and	Publication	(GAPP)	announced	the	
establishment	of	a	‘24‐Hour	Real	Time	Web‐Publishing	Content	
Reading	and	Monitoring	Mechanism.’	In	addition	to	serving	the	
censorship	function,	this	system	is	also	charged	with	the	
responsibility	of	gathering	and	analyzing	intelligence	regarding	the	
general	ideological	and	content	orientation	of	web	publishing.”29		
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The	Chinese	government	has	a	significant	degree	of	power	over	the	entire	media	
system;	therefore,	with	the	increasing	importance	placed	on	the	Internet,	the	
Chinese	citizen’s	worry	of	producing	inappropriate	content	online	is	well	founded.		
In	practice	it	is	best	for	the	public	to	say	nothing	and	to	keep	their	opinions	to	
themselves,	otherwise	they	could	end	up	with	significant	consequences,	as	other	
citizens	have	already	experienced.		Failing	to	abide	by	the	Chinese	government’s	
internet	regulations	may	result	similarly	to	a	case	during	2003	and	2004	“where	as	
many	as	seventeen	internet	activists	were	tried	and	punished	with	jail	sentences	up	
to	fourteen	years,	making	China	the	top	country	for	jailing	internet	activists”30.		This	
is	an	illustration	of	how	the	government	exercises	their	authority	over	the	Chinese	
people,	who	have	no	power,	and	demonstrates	the	scope	of	their	control	over	
China’s	cyberspace.	
	 According	to	Yuezhi	Zhao’s	Reconfiguring	Party‐State	Power,	“the	role	of	the	
Chinese	government	in	micromanaging	media	structure	and	disciplining	the	media	
has	been	significantly	expanded	along	with	the	role	of	repressive	state	apparatuses	
such	as	the	police	and	the	courts	in	the	prosecution	of	dissent.31”		The	Chinese	
government	has	been	successful	in	its	efforts	to	control	the	information	flow	
between	people	outside	of	China	with	people	inside	of	China,	and	to	suppress	
Chinese	citizens	from	publically	criticizing	the	Communist	Party	through	the	
																																																								
30	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
	
31	Zhao, Yuezhi. "Reconfiguring Party-State Power: Market Reforms, Communication, and Control in the 
Digital Age." Communication in China: Political Economy, Power, and Conflict: 20-64. Print.	
	
establishment	of	its	propaganda	disciplines.		Through	its	laws	and	regulations,	it	is	
clear	the	government’s	goal	for	governing	all	media	operations,	including	the	
Internet,	is	to	lessen	the	threat	to	their	authoritarian	regime,	retain	traditional	levels	
of	propaganda	control,	prohibit	the	empowerment	of	citizens,	maintain	social	
stability,	and	confirm	that	Internet	users	don’t	“deviate	from	the	official	Communist	
party	doctrine.	This	includes	the	Four	Cardinal	Principals:	Socialism,	the	
dictatorship	of	the	proletariat,	the	leadership	of	the	Communist	Party,	and	Marxism‐
Leninism‐Mao	Zedong	thought.32”	While	the	party	has	many	methods	of	surveillance	
for	the	media,	they	have	also	been	successful	in	promoting	self‐censorship.		
According	to	Jongpil	Chung,	author	of	Comparing	Online	Activities	in	China	and	South	
Korea:	The	Internet	and	the	Political	Regime,	there	are	two	strategies	to	repress	
politically	sensitive	or	“subversive”	content	online.	The	first	refers	to	technical	
methods	that	involve	the	cyber	police	and	legal	regulations	enabling	screening	of	
online	content.	The	second	is	where	the	government	implements	various	types	of	
surveillance	and	takes	punitive	actions	to	boost	the	public’s	self‐censorship33.		Some	
business	owners	are	so	fearful	for	being	held	responsible	and	liable	for	
inappropriate	content	online	that	they	hire	alternative	workers	to	monitor	their	
networks	information.	Literature	shows	that	“most	online	users	are	unwilling	to	
express	their	feelings	about	the	Communist	party	or	the	government	on‐and‐off‐line	
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due	to	officials’	threats	of	harsh	punishment”34.		These,	along	with	several	other	
factors,	are	the	reasons	responsible	for	the	general	Chinese	online	population’s	
restricted	behavior	and	self‐censorship.	However,	as	people	continue	their	efforts	
and	attempts	in	gathering	previously	inaccessible	information,	the	government	will	
continue	to	impose	new	laws	in	their	endeavor	to	maintain	media	control.		
METHODOLOGY	AND	WORK	PLAN	
	 		This	study	is	based	on	a	heuristic	questionnaire	consisting	of	subject	matter	
with	regard	to	Chinese	students’	online	user	behavior	on	the	social	network	system	
Facebook,	while	they	are	in	the	United	States,	and	literature	reviews	pertaining	to	
the	cyber	social	networking	world.		While	conducting	extensive	research	on	social	
network	systems,	with	specific	attention	being	directed	to	information	relating	to	
China’s	RenRen	and	America’s	Facebook,	I	learned	that	the	Chinese	populations	
impose	a	measure	of	self‐imposed	restriction	of	information	disclosure	regarding	
their	online	behavior.	A	focused	questionnaire	was	devised	to	explore	whether	
Chinese	students,	from	the	ages	of	eighteen	to	twenty	two	who	are	living	in	the	USA	
and	studying	at	Union	College,	changed	their	online	habits	as	a	result	of	western	
cultural	influences,	and	if	governmental	censure	or	oversight	influenced	the	kind	or	
amount	of	personal	information	they	shared.		Several	online	articles	and	journals,	
written	by	native	Chinese	and	Westerners,	provide	information	as	to	how	China’s	
online	population	self	censor	their	behavior	regarding	expression,	and	analyze	the	
reasons	for	insight	why	the	Chinese	users	behave	in	this	manner.		
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												As	for	the	questionnaire,	twenty	Chinese	students	were	electronically	sent	the	
survey	via	e‐mail.	In	order	to	ascertain	whether	the	student’s	online	behaviors	have	
changed	since	they	left	China	and	came	to	the	USA,	I	asked	questions	such	as:	how	
do	you	use	Facebook,	do	you	think	RenRen	and	Facebook	basically	serve	the	same	
function,	and	do	you	think	that	you	have	experienced	change	and	now	share	more	
information	on	Facebook	than	you	did	previously?	The	results	and	findings	
developed	as	a	result	of	this	human	studies	project	are	understood	to	only	be	
preliminary,	as	only	five	students	completed	and	returned	the	questionnaire;	
respondent	participation	being	25	percent,	but	of	a	very	small	sample	population.	
My	goal	is	to	gain	an	understanding	of	how	the	Chinese	students	act	when	they	are	
integrated	into	a	new	cultural	context,	one	in	which	the	government	plays	a	less	
prominent	role	in	monitoring	personal	online	behavior.	This	study	will	help	convey	
the	participants’	knowledge	and	opinions	regarding	online	censorship	in	China,	and	
discover	if	they	are	even	aware	of	how	excessive	censoring	online	material	has	
become.	Once	all	of	the	participants’	data	is	compiled	and	analyzed,	I	will	use	the	
response	information,	along	with	literature	reviews,	to	demonstrate	support	or	
rejection	regarding	my	hypothesis.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
BODY	OF	WORK	
Questions	 Participant	
1	
Participant	
2	
Participant	
3	
Participant	
4	
Participant		
5	
1	 8/2011	 9/2010	 8/2011	 9/2011	 9/2008	
2	 Four	Years	 Four	Years	 Four	Years	 Four	Years	 Four	Years	
3	 Freshman	 Sophomore Freshman	 Freshman	 Senior	
4	 20	 21	 19	 18	 22	
5	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
6	 B,C	 A,	B,C,D	 A,B,C	 B,	C	 D	
7	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
8	 Less	 Less	 Less	 The	same	 The	same	
9	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No	 No	
10	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
11	 B,yes	 A,B,C,D,	 A,yes‐b,yes‐
d,yes‐e,yes	
B,C,D,E	 B,yes		
12	 D	 D	 D	 D	 D	
13	 A,B,C	 A,B,C,D	 A,B	 B,C,D	 B,C	
D	
14	 B	 C	 C	 B	 C	
15	 No	 No	 No	 No	 No	
16	 No	 No	 No‐c	 No‐a,b,c	 No	
17	 No	 No	 Yes‐	a,b	 No‐a,b,c	 Yes‐	a		
18	 No	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	
19	 No	 No	 Yes,	has	
explanation
No	 No	
20	 No	 Yes	 No	 Yes	 No	
21	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 No,	has	
explanation	
No	
		
	
	 This	section	of	the	report	focuses	on	the	self‐reported	questionnaire	results	
and	analyzes	the	participants’	behavior	towards	Facebook.		This	aspect	of	the	report	
reflects	only	preliminary	findings,	as	the	response	rate	was	five	returned	
questionnaires	out	of	a	possible	twenty	returns,	(a	twenty	five	percent	response	
rate)	which	would	ordinarily	allow	findings	to	be	projected	with	more	certainty;	
this	is	not	the	case	when	the	sample	size	and	respondent	numbers	are	so	small.		
Nevertheless,	the	preliminary	findings	will	contribute	to	further	research	efforts,	
and	pose	additional	questions	and	issues	to	be	probed	in	subsequent	research.		Out	
of	the	five	individual	respondents	who	have	self‐reported	their	attitudes	and	
behaviors	on	Facebook,	three	are	freshmen,	one	is	a	sophomore,	and	one	is	a	senior.		
As	I	began	reviewing	their	survey	responses,	I	found	it	interesting	to	note	that	the	
three	freshman	responses	are	similar	to	each	other	and	different	from	the	other	two	
participants;	this	could	be	a	result	of	the	fact	they	have	spent	less	time	in	the	United	
States	compared	to	the	other	students,	as	they	have	yet	to	complete	their	second	
trimester	at	Union	College.			
ANALYSIS	OF	PARTICIPANT	RESPONSES		
	 All	of	the	students	arrived	at	Union	College	in	August	or	September	of	their	
freshman	year	and	all	intend	to	complete	four	years	of	education;	their	ages	are	
from	18	to	22	years	old.		All	participants	used	the	Chinese	SNS	RenRen	prior	to	
coming	to	the	United	States	and	all	generally	report	its	primary	use	was	to:	gather	
information	about	friends,	to	share	information,	and	to	express	themselves.	Now	the	
participants	use	RenRen	either	the	same	(two	participants)	or	less	(three	
participants)	amount,	and	they	all	joined	Facebook	and	are	frequent	users	(five	
participants)	reporting	daily,	if	not	more	often.		Two	of	the	three	freshman	and	the	
sophomore	reported	being	able	to	access	Facebook	in	China,	which	I	interpret	to	
mean	they	apparently	had	access	to	some	proxy	outlet	that	provided	them	entry	to	
the	SNS	site	without	coming	to	the	attention	and	notice	of	China’s	cyber‐police.	
Considering	the	Chinese	restriction	of	Facebook,	it	seems	a	reasonable	assumption	
that	the	proxy	must	have	provided	secure	assess,	since	the	censors	appear	not	to	
have	targeted	or	terminated	the	students’	activity.		However,	another	possibility	
may	also	be	that	they	simply	did	not	bother	because	the	content	was	not	deemed	
problematic.		It	has	been	be	reported	that	“(a)s	far	as	the	Internet	goes	the	
government	is	only	interested	in	making	sure	that	the	vast	majority	do	not	get	
unfiltered	access.	Communication	has	never	simply	been	an	issue	of	free	expression.	
It	has	always	been	an	integral	part	of	political	organization	and	social	
mobilization.35”		
	 It	is	difficult	to	accurately	identify	the	primary	reason	the	students	had	for	
joining	Facebook,	because	instead	of	selecting	only	one	reason	as	requested,	there	
were	a	total	of	fourteen	responses	in	total.		However,	the	choice	“to	gather	
information	about	friends	and	events”	was	cited	by	each	of	the	five	students,	while	
“to	easily	communicate	and	express	myself	with	friends”	received	three	responses	
and	the	remaining	three	choices	each	received	two	responses.		Regarding	how	
Facebook	is	used,	all	five	again	selected	“gather	information	about	friends	and	
events,”	and	then	four	students	also	cited	“share	information	and	express	myself	to	
friends.”		“Expanding	our	social	network	and	making	friends,”	and	“easily	
communicate	electronically	with	friends”	were	both	cited	three	times.	
		 I	was	somewhat	surprised	when	I	analyzed	responses	to	the	next	few	
questions.		From	my	research,	and	my	limited	visits	to	China,	I	anticipated	some	
respondents	would	report	they	controlled	the	degree	of	personal	information	
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disclosed	by	“self‐imposed	restriction,”	yet	none	reported	using	this	method,	rather	
all	five	rely	on	Facebook	privacy	tools;	two	relying	on	the	standard	“default”	
settings,	while	three	reported	they	“make	changes	and	customize	the	privacy	
settings	to	meet	my	needs.”			I	was	particularly	surprised	that	all	five	respondents	
reported	that	governmental	control	over	a	social	network	service	is	not	an	influence	
over	their	decision	regarding	posting	personal	information;	it	seems	to	be	contrary	
to	my	literature	review,	which	would	suggest	that	there	is	concern	about	disclosing	
personal	information	in	China	due	to	the	government’s	constant	monitoring.		
However,	all	five	again	reflected	that	the	fact	that	no	governmental	censorship	of	
Facebook	postings	in	the	United	States	has	no	bearing	or	influence	of	these	
respondents’	use	of	Facebook.	
	 Is	it	possible	that	none	of	these	five	participants	are	aware	of	how	extensive	
and	restrictive	China’s	control	is	over	the	Internet	and	its	media?	Perhaps	they	are	
aware	and	this	doesn’t	bother	them—as	the	Chinese	government	guidelines	are	
continually	in	the	news	making	these	students	aware	of	the	fact	that	the	Chinese	
government	has	in	the	past,	and	continues	to	engage	in	stringent	Internet	use	and	
content	regulation,	which	includes	oversight	and	supervision	of	the	public’s	use.			
The	Internet	Society	of	China	(ISC)	was	founded	in	May	2001.	It	is	a	
national	organization	of	the	Internet	industry	with	a	remit	for	serving	
the	development	of	that	industry,	netizens	and	the	decisions	of	the	
government.	The	ISC	has	issued	a	series	of	self‐disciplinary	
regulations,	including	the	Public	Pledge	of	Self‐regulation	and	
Professional	Ethics	for	the	China	Internet	Industry,	Provisions	of	Self‐
regulation	on	not	spreading	Harmful	Information	for	Internet	
Websites,	Public	Pledge	of	Self‐regulation	on	Anti‐malicious	Software,	
Public	Pledge	of	Self‐regulation	on	Blog	Service,	Public	Pledge	of	Self‐
regulation	on	Anti‐Internet	Virus,	Declaration	of	Self‐regulation	on	
Copyright	Protection	of	China's	Internet	Industry,	and	other	
regulations,	which	greatly	promote	the	healthy	development	of	the	
Internet.36				
	These	pledges	are	efforts	of	the	Chinese	government	to	greatly	promote	the	healthy	
development	of	the	internet	by	making	appropriate	conduct	known.		The	above	lists	
are	examples	of	online	topics	members	must	constantly	be	mindful	of	to	avoid	
coming	into	negative	contact	with	the	government.		Perhaps	these	students	are	
unconcerned	about	any	monitoring	because	their	postings	are	essentially	innocuous	
and	of	little	interest	or	concern	to	any	governmental	entity.		Regardless,	the	
question	of	if,	and	how,	Chinese	students	may	be	affected	by	governmental	internet	
control	and	posting	of	personal	information	is	an	area	warranting	further	research,	
at	a	deeper	level	with	a	statistically	viable	sample	population,	that	will	allow	
projections	to	be	made	regarding	the	actions	and	opinions	of	the	larger	population	
of	college	students.	Regarding	whether	the	method	of	selecting	friends	on	RenRen	
and	Facebook	differed,	two	respondents	answered	yes,	and	both	students	reported	
they	“accept	requests	from	fellow	students	I	have	met,”	and	one	also	noted	
acceptance	of	“requests	from	all	Union	College	students.”		Of	the	three	students	
saying	their	method	for	accepting	friends	did	not	change,	one	student	then	went	on	
to	also	chose	each	of	three	reasons	for	accepting	a	Facebook	friend.		
	 	A	discrepancy	was	noted	in	question	18	when	two	respondents,	a	freshman	
and	the	senior,	said	yes	that	“cultural	influences	cause	you	(them	personally)	to	
restrict	the	amount	of	personal	identifiable	information	you	make	on	line,”	and	to	
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which	three	said	no;	yet	at	question	14	none	of	the	students	reported	there	was	any	
“self‐imposed	restriction”	regarding	disclosure	of	personal	information.		Absent	a	
potential	misunderstanding	over	“disclosing	personal	information”	in	Q‐14,	versus	
“personal	identifiable	information”	in	Q‐18,	I	cannot	reconcile	the	difference.	
Research	has	suggested	that	cultural	collectivism	influences	Chinese	people	to	value	
group	orientation	over	individual	expression,	and	that	self‐discipline	is	practiced	to	
restrict	the	degree	of	personal	information	disclosed.	Still,	considering	the	
unanimous	denial	answering	question	14	and	three	of	the	five	students	denying	a	
cultural	influence,	it	seems	to	suggest	that	any	cultural	influences	may	have	a	
minimal	effect.	
		 Only	one	of	the	five	respondents	answered	Question	19	by	saying	yes,	that	
he/she	thinks	they	have	experienced	change	coming	to	the	United	States	and	that	
they	share	more	information	than	they	do	on	RenRen;		that	student	stated	“I	have	
more	American	friends	now	and	want	to	share	my	experience	with	them	on	
Facebook.”			[Refer	to	attached	Chart].	Regarding	whether	Chinese	users	would	
“share	more	information	in	China	if	Facebook	was	available	and	operated	in	the	
same	manner	as	the	United	States,	without	governmental	control	or	censorship,”	
two	students	said	yes	and	three	said	no;	but	one	that	answered	no	was	the	student	
from	Question	19,	who	said	he/she	shares	more	information	on	Facebook	than	they	
do	on	RenRen.			It	seems	somewhat	contrary	for	this	respondent	to	say	Chinese	
users	would	not	share	more	information	given	the	same	opportunity	in	China,	when	
that	is	what	this	student	has	done	in	the	United	States;	wouldn’t	other	Chinese	
online	users	behave	in	the	same	manner	if	given	the	opportunity,	especially	as	this	
respondent	stated	RenRen	and	Facebook	serve	the	same	function.	In	the	final	
question	three	respondents	thought	RenRen	and	Facebook	basically	serve	the	same	
functions	while	two	did	not;	one	of	them	(Participant	four)	explained	…		
“RenRen	has	more	information	than	Facebook.	We	can	easily	see	
articles,	pictures	and	videos	on	RenRen.	We	can	also	write	blogs,	
listen	to	radios	and	get	presents	from	RenRen	Company.		RenRen	also	
acts	as	a	platform	for	people	to	talk	about	important	stuff	happens	in	
our	country.	The	flow	of	information	is	very	quick	on	RenRen.	Also	it	
is	somewhat	like	an	Internet	supervisor	of	the	government.	It	reveals	
the	bad	side	of	the	society	and	makes	netizens	think	deeply	about	the	
human	nature	and	arises	people’s	justice	and	care	for	others.	RenRen	
provides	different	topics	for	people	to	talk	about.	For	example,	it	is	
Chinese	New	Year	now,	the	status	column	will	automatically	appear	
these	words:	‘what	is	your	wishes	for	the	New	Year?	Please	write	
down	your	wishes	for	your	family	and	friends.’	Take	another	example,	
when	China	was	undergoing	the	big	earthquake	several	years	ago,	
RenRen	status	column	will	show	these	words	‘let’s	pray	for	people	
who	are	now	suffering	from	the	earthquake.’	Also	you	can	find	articles	
about	how	to	learn	English	or	Spanish,	the	experience	of	Chinese	
students	studying	abroad	and	so	on.	RenRen	is	not	just	a	network	for	
people	meeting	new	friends;	it	also	involves	politics,	sociology	
anthropology	and	is	more	like	a	big	information	platform.”		
This	student’s	response	demonstrates	some	of	the	differences	provided	between	
RenRen	and	Facebook’s	features.	However,	experienced	Facebook	users	would	
argue	that	they	too	have	the	ability	to	easily	see	articles,	photos	and	videos,	as	well	
as	read	and	share	important	information	or	any	information	they	choose	for	that	
matter	with	their	online	friends.	Consequently,	it	seems	possible,	if	not	probable,	
that	this	user	is	not	fully	aware	of	all	of	Facebook’s	features,	and	doesn’t	seem	to	
fully	grasp	its	online	culture.		It	is	interesting	to	note,	this	participant	mentioned	
RenRen	“provides	different	topics	for	people	to	talk	about,”	in	fact	a	feature	
Facebook	does	not	offer,	however	the	motivation	behind	the	reasons	why	RenRen	
and	its	staff	might	supply	“topics	to	talk	about”	would	easily	be	a	topic	for	debate,	
considering	what	the	research	has	revealed	about	China’s	monitoring	and	censoring	
activities.		
	 I	also	noted	that	the	freshman	(Participant	four)	provided	some	conflicting	
responses;	answering	question	18	and	19	saying	“no”	if	“cultural	influences	cause	
you	to	restrict	the	amount	of	personal	identifiable	information	you	make	available	
on‐line,”	and	that	this	student	did	not	believe	he/she	had	“experienced	change	and	
now	share	more	information	on	Facebook	than	you	did	previously.”		In	light	of	these	
responses,	it	then	becomes	confusing	why	this	user	would	answer	“yes”	to	question	
20,	which	asked,	“do	you	think	if	Facebook	were	available	in	China	and	operated	in	
the	same	manner	as	the	United	States,	including	no	governmental	control	or	
censorship,	that	Chinese	users	would	share	more	personal	information	and	
communicate	more	openly	online?”		Perhaps	the	inconsistent	responses	reflect	
thinking	that	Chinese	people	may	attach	more	importance	to	cultural	limitations	
regarding	self	disclosure,	or	they	might	somehow	be	more	concerned	about	the	
government	knowing	or	potentially	being	aware	of	information	they	would	post;	
there	is	no	way	of	knowing	the	underlying	basis	to	why	particular	answers	were	
reported.		
	 As	previously	mentioned	in	the	limitation	section	of	the	report,	there	were	
time	constraints	and	conflicting	demands	that	precluded	pursuing	personal	
interviews	that	would	have	enabled	me	to	delve	into	the	“thought	process”	and	
reasons	underlying	particular	beliefs	of	some	of	the	students.			According	to	Jongpil	
Chung,	China	exerts	the	most	rigorous	Internet	censorship	in	the	world	and	employs	
strong,	sophisticated	control	over	what	its	people	read,	see	and	hear.	The	Chinese	
government	is	obsessed	with	ensuring	that	its	people	have	access	to	the	“correct”	
information	that	supports	the	state’s	propaganda37.		It	seems	compelling	to	believe	
that	when	a	government	intends	to	control	what	people	read,	it	must	also	control	
what	others	say;	these	new	instantaneous	electronic	communication	capabilities	of	
the	internet,	including	blogs,	social	network	systems,	are	increasingly	important	
targets	of	such	control.		
DOES	TIME	OUTSIDE	CHINA	MAKE	A	DIFFERENCE	
	 A	particular	question	of	interest	during	this	research	was	to	examine	
whether	or	not	the	Chinese	students	who	have	been	at	Union	College	longer,	have	
different	responses	because	they	have	been	immersed	in	the	United	State’s	culture	
for	a	longer	period	of	time.		If	so,	it	would	be	interesting	to	track	the	current	
freshman	respondents	to	see	if	their	opinions	and	behaviors	change	by	their	senior	
year,	and	then	to	try	and	see	if	whether	any	differences	are	based	in	the	fact	that	the	
absence	of	pervasive	governmental	oversight	prompted,	or	allowed	them	to	be	
more	open.		Unfortunately,	the	small	number	of	Chinese	Union	College	students	
(twenty),	with	the	twenty	five	percent	return	rate	of	five,	resulted	in	only	two	
students	having	lived	more	than	six	months	in	The	United	States;	one	sophomore	
with	a	year	and	a	half,	and	one	senior	with	three	and	a	half	years.		
	 Analyzing	the	sophomore	(Participant	two)	and	senior	(Participant	five)	
responses,	I	noted	different	answers:	Q‐8,	Q‐9,	Q‐17,	Q‐18,	Q‐20	and	Q‐21.		On	
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Question	eight	regarding	current	usage	of	RenRen,	Participant	two	uses	the	SNS	less	
while	Participant	five	uses	it	the	same	amount.		I	wonder	if	a	possible	reason	may	be	
that	Participant	two	stated	he/she	had	access	to	Facebook	in	China,	and	may	already	
have	a	formed	a	group	of	online	friends	in	China	using	this	SNS,	whereas	Participant	
five	was	not	able	to	use	Facebook	in	China,	and	may	be	continuing	to	“communicate	
and	share	information	with	his/her	friends	in	China	through	RenRen.	Also	her	four	
years	at	Union	is	ending	in	a	few	months	and	a	return	to	China	may	be	imminent,	
absent	other	educational	or	career	arrangements.		Interestingly	both	participants	
were	the	only	users	to	select	the	answer	choice	(Question	6)	they	continue	to	use	
RenRen	to	“easily	communicate	electronically	with	select	groups	of	friends.”			
	 Differing	from	Participant	two	and	two	of	the	freshman,	Participant	five’s	
answers	seem	to	suggest	a	little	less	online	“openness”	with	regards	to	selecting	
friends	in	the	manner	and	purposes	for	which	Facebook	is	normally	used.		
Participant	answered	his/her	method	of	selecting	friends	on	Facebook	is	different	
than	that	used	for	RenRen,	and	that	friend	requests	are	accepted	from	fellow	
students	that	he/she	has	met,	which	was	the	most	restrictive	choice.	Participant	
two,	on	the	other	hand,	reported	no	difference	in	how	his/her	on‐line	friends	are	
selected.		Moreover,	while	Participant	five	reported	belief	of	governmental	control	
on	a	SNS	did	not	influence	his/her	decision	whether	or	not	to	disclosed	personal	
information	on‐line	(question	15),	yet	at	the	same	time	reported	that	cultural	
influences	cause	him/her	to	restrict	the	amount	of	personal	identifiable	information	
made	available	online.		Participant	two	agreed	that	governmental	control	did	not	
influence	his/her	decision	regarding	personal	information	disclosed	online,	but	also	
rejected	the	idea	that	cultural	influences	determine	what	personal	information	
he/she	makes	available	online.		Research	has	suggested	that	cultural	collectivism	
influences	Chinese	people	to	value	group	orientation	over	individual	expression,	
and	that	self‐discipline	is	commonly	practiced	to	restrict	the	degree	of	personal	
information	disclosed.		I	suggest	that	governmental	influences	and	control	have	
direct	societal	impacts	on	the	cultural	norms	and	influences	that	affect	today’s	
Chinese	population.		The	fact	that	the	Chinese	government	has	“imprisoned	more	
journalists	than	any	other	country	and	ranks	163rd	out	of	168	rated	countries	on	
press	freedom,”	demonstrates	the	willingness	to	impose	measures	to	reinforce	and	
indoctrinate	people	with	government	selected	“cultural	norms”	and	values38.		
Therefore,	it	is	not	surprising	that	one	may	remain	silent	due	to	the	“uncertainty	
and	vagueness	of	the	Chinese	media	self‐censorship	regime,”	and	it	appears	
possible,	that	participant	five	has	to	a	degree	accepted	such	control	as	a	matter	of	
course39.		For	example,	by	reflecting	that	he/she	has	not	experienced	a	change	in	
how	much	personal	information	they	share	on	Facebook	while	in	a	situation	being	
afforded	significant	freedom	of	expression	absent	government	controls,	and	that	
he/she	does	not	believe	Chinese	users	would	communicate	more	openly	even	if	
Facebook	was	accessible	with	the	same	degree	of	freedom	and	openness	in	China.		
Perhaps	such	thinking	might	explain	his/her	reasoning	to	question	21’s	answer,	that	
RenRen	and	Facebook	do	not	serve	the	same	function;	use	of	Facebook	in	America	is	
to	allow	users	to	focus	on	the	friends/people	and	gathering	information	about	
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events,	whereas	RenRen	(according	to	research	studies)	is	used	to	focus	on	its	
people,	to	enable	its	monitoring	of	users,	restriction	of	un‐desirable	information	
being	disseminated,	and	to	promote	Communist	Party	propaganda.	
CONCLUSION	AND	RECOMMENDATIONS	
	
	 Several	observations	can	be	made	from	reviewing	the	questionnaires,	but	all	
require	further	research	before	they	could	be	presented	with	any	measure	of	
meaningful	validity,	as	the	answers	posed	additional	questions	for	further	inquiry.	
This	research	report	of	Chinese	students	studying	at	Union	College	is	based	on	only	
five	electronically	returned	completed	survey	questionnaires	out	of	a	possible	
twenty,	a	respectful	response	rate	of	twenty	five	percent	(25%).	The	small	sample	
size	however,	does	not	permit	any	findings	or	conclusions	to	be	claimed	as	
indicative	of	the	opinions	and	actions	of	other	Chinese	students	studying	at	Union	or	
the	United	States	in	general.			Findings	in	this	research	study	can	only	really	be	
related	to	this	particular	sample	population,	and	perhaps	used	to	preliminarily	
suggest	issues	for	future	studies	to	pursue	and	provide	grounded	answers.		
	 Respondent’s	answers	to	the	project	questionnaire	rejected	the	hypothesis	
which	was	advanced;	that	the	combination	of	American	cultural	influence	and	the	
greater	“freedom	of	expression”	afforded	to	Facebook	SNS	users	will	affect	and	
change	their	online	behavior(s).		Rather,	all	five	students	answered	that	they	were	
not	influenced	regarding	what	personal	information	they	disclose	on	Facebook	by	
the	fact	there	is	no	governmental	censorship	of	the	SNS	postings,	and	all	five	equally	
denied	that	governmental	control	of	a	SNS	influences	their	own	decision	whether	or	
not	to	disclose	personal	information.		Yet,	at	the	same	time,	two	respondents	
thought	that	users	in	China	would	share	more	information	and	communicate	more	
openly	if	Facebook	operated	in	China	without	governmental	censorship	in	the	same	
manner	as	the	United	States.		This	was	a	surprise;	my	review	of	research	material	
suggested	that	concern	over	governmental	censorship	causes	online	users	to	be	
somewhat	cautious	regarding	their	postings.	This	impression	is	supported	by	some	
personal,	but	minimal	exposure	to	Chinese	college	students	at	Peking	University	
over	a	period	of	a	few	months.		I	expected	that	the	survey	would	show	that	the	
students,	if	not	initially,	then	over	time	in	this	country	would	share	more	
information	and	post	more	openly	than	they	had	in	China.	This	study	was	to	
investigate	the	online	habits	of	Chinese	students	who	have	been	living	and	studying	
at	Union	College	for	at	least	six	months,	and	compare	their	primary	usage	of	the	
Social	Networks	RenRen	and	Facebook。	
WHAT	WAS	FOUND	
		 Several	conflicting	responses	were	observed	during	analysis	of	participant	
answers	to	the	questionnaire.	[For	example,	while	all	five	students	claimed	
governmental	control	over	SNS’s,	does	not	influence	whether	they	decide	to	share	
certain	personal	information	online,	they	do	not	believe	they	self	impose	
restrictions].	Participant	five,	who	had	the	most	time	in	this	country,	actually	agreed	
that	cultural	influences	do	cause	him/her	to	restrict	identifiable	information	he/she	
makes	available	online.		This	particular	piece	of	information	is	noteworthy,	because	
while	Participant	five	had	the	same	initial	attitude	and	reasons	for	joining	RenRen	
and	Facebook	as	the	other	four	students;	his/her	responses	pertaining	to	online	
restriction	and	personal	censorship	differed	from	the	others.	Participant	five	has	
been	living	and	residing	at	Union	College’s	campus	for	two	to	three	years	longer	
than	the	other	four	participants,	and	can	be	expected	to	have	had	more	exposure	
and	experience	to	the	U.S.A.’s	“individualistic	culture.”	It	would	be	interesting	to	
assess	the	other	respondents’	online	behavior	later	in	their	college	careers	to	see	if	
their	answers	changed	over	time,	and	study	if	they	will	be	closer	to	Participant	five’s	
answers	now.	Participant	five,	along	with	Participant	four,	provided	some	validation	
(40%)	to	the	study	hypothesis	that	Facebook	and	RenRen	do	not	serve	the	same	
function,	as	well	as,	Participants	five	and	three	agree,	as	suggested	by	various	
research	sources,	that	“cultural	collectivism	influences	Chinese	people	to	value	
group	orientation	over	individual	expression,	and	that	self‐discipline	is	practiced	to	
restrict	the	degree	of	personal	information	disclosed.“		The	20%	differences	in	both	
questions	that	disagree	represent	one	student,	so	no	statistical	reliability	can	be	
asserted.		
	 The	study	revealed	that	participants	one,	two	and	three,	accessed/used	
Facebook	while	they	were	in	China.		Therefore,	it	seems	reasonable	to	surmise	that	
these	individuals	may	have	had	the	ability	to	enter	the	SNS	by	a	proxy	server,	and	
were	not	then	monitored	or	targeted	by	censors;	or,	perhaps	the	individuals	were	in	
fact	“spotted”	by	the	government	monitors	but	left	alone	because	the	manner	of	
their	use	was	not	considered	threatening	to	the	government’s	propaganda.		I	
assumed	that	there	would	be	more	commentary	provided	by	the	students	on	the	
questionnaire	when	they	were	responding	to	the	survey	questions;	however,	
according	to	Jens	Damm,	author	of	The	Internet	and	the	Fragmentation	of	Chinese	
Society,	the	Chinese	online	population	today	is	much	more	concerned	with	the	
consumer	lifestyle	than	they	are	politics.	Damm	gives	a	detailed	explanation	as	to	
why	the	Chinese	government	has	and	continues	to	enforce	control	over	the	media	
and	its	content	online,	and,	how	the	focus	of	many	Chinese	users	today	no	longer	
lies	with	China’s	politics.		
THE	FOCUS	OF	TODAY’S	CHINESE	ONLINE	POPULATION	
	 There	are	many	Chinese	citizens	who	use	the	Internet	to	search	for	specific	
online	information	regarding	the	Chinese	government	and	its	activities,	which	is	one	
primary	reason	why	the	government	has	imposed	such	rigid	barriers	denying	
individuals	access	to	specific	online	sites40.		China	is	well	aware	that	the	online	
communication	world	acts	as	a	ready	and	efficient	portal	for	all	types	of	
communication:	“one‐to‐one,	one‐to‐many,	many‐to‐many,	and	many‐to‐one;”	such	
portals	allow	for	an	interactive	dialogue	where	everybody	has	the	opportunity	to	
become	his/her	own	publisher	with	only	marginal	costs.41”		The	concern	of	easily	
accessing	information	through	a	number	of	different	channels	alone	poses	a	
sufficient	potential	threat	to	the	Chinese	government.	Therefore,	the	government	
actively	engages	in	censorship	and	monitoring	of	all	online	activity	in	order	to	
prevent	their	people	from	using	electronic	means	of	communication	where	they	
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could	become	too	big	a	source	of	leverage	and	power	in	real	world	politics.42	If	the	
mass	population	online	did	in	fact	become	this	huge	source	of	power	in	their	
nation’s	politics,	then	one	can	predict	people	would	surely	change	their	behavior	
online	in	an	attempt	to	exercise	the	information	they	post	and	share.	
	 On	the	other	hand,	perhaps	similar	to	these	particular	survey	users,	it	may	be	
that	China’s	young	adult	population	of	online	users	have	different,	and	more	
personal	interests	when	using	the	Internet,	as	it	is	apparent	that	today’s	Chinese	
Internet	users	“consider	social	and	commercial	uses	of	the	Internet	much	more	
important	that	political	uses.43”	This	would	surely	explain	their	evident	lack	of	care	
when	responding	to	the	survey	questions	pertaining	to	political	controls	over	SNSs.		
The	knack	for	embracing	information	technology	begins	at	a	young	age,	with	
children	imitating	their	parents	and	interacting	with	those	who	are	constantly	
surrounding	them	with	technological	appliances.		For	instance,	in	January	of	2002,	
photographer	Greg	Baker	captured	a	photograph	shot	of	a	Chinese	toddler	playing	
with	his	father’s	cell	phone,	emphasizing	the	fact	that	China	is	already	the	largest	
mobile	phone	market	in	the	world.		Journalist	Xie	Fang	wrote,	“information	is	one	of	
the	most	efficient	means	by	which	a	country	can	achieve	industrialization,	gain	
economic	benefits	and	increase	production	efficiency…	the	Internet	is	a	critical	
multiplier	in	China’s	drive	toward	achieving	an	advanced	level	of	economic	
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development.44”		It	is	amazing	to	see	how	China	already	has	the	fastest	growing	
network	for	mobile	phones	in	the	world;	it	would	not	be	a	surprise	to	see	the	trend	
continue	with	Internet	users.		However,	as	the	number	of	Internet	users	continues	
to	flourish	in	China,	it	seems	obvious	that	the	Chinese	government	will	place	
particular	emphasis	on	promoting	e‐commerce	and	e‐businesses,	and	to	keep	their	
citizens’	attention	focused	on	available	consumer	products,	while	continuing	to	
steer	them	away	from	using	electronic	media	to	advocate	societal	changes	within	
the	country.	It	is	possible	that	this	process	is	already	being	experimented	with	on	
social	networks,	and	that	the	government	is	experiencing	or	hoping	for	success	
among	its	users.	That	being	said,	this	method	of	advertising	may	underlie	some	of	
the	respondent	“online	thinking”	produced	in	this	study.		These	are	only	
suppositions	absent	of	demonstrable	proof	at	this	time	however,	despite	some	
preliminary	potential	indications	and	logical	assessment.		
CONCLUSION	
	 Based	upon	the	results	of	this	experiment,	and	the	literary	reviews	regarding	
this	topic,	I	wonder	if	the	results	were	possibly	skewed,	and	if	these	five	Chinese	
participant	were	sufficiently	self‐aware	of	the	level	of	internalized	“self‐imposed”	
restrictions	that	have	been	instilled	over	essentially	two	decades	of	living	in	China;	
or,	do	they	already	reflect	an	openness	to	share	more	information	over	electronic	
media.	The	data	obtained	from	this	study	seems	to	run	contrary	to	research	citing	
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that	Chinese	online	users	have	concerns	over	information	that	they	are	allowed	to	
post	online	in	China.			
	 This	study	did	not	produce	information	suggesting	the	five	college	students	
had	concerns	over	how	they	use	the	Internet,	SNS	sites	specifically,	or	what	they	
posted	in	either	China	or	the	United	States.	It	is	not	surprising	then,	when	they	state	
that	they	do	not	believe	they	act	any	differently	since	they	came	to	Union	College.		
The	conclusion,	at	least	regarding	the	beliefs	and	actions	of	these	survey	
participants,	would	seem	to	be	that	there	is	no	difference	in	how	they	use	online	
social	network	systems,	and	that	they	feel	little	cultural	influence	regarding	how	
they	post	and	share	information	online;	nor	do	they	feel	restricted	in	their	decisions	
regarding	concern	over	governmental	actions.		
	 This	survey	has	left	a	number	of	unresolved	questions,	and	it	would	be	
interesting	to	learn:	1)	Will/would	the	results	be	replicated	by	a	larger	number	of	
Chinese	students,	2)	Is	the	reported	behavior	and	opinions	prevalent	among	
Chinese	college	students	both	in	China	as	well	as	the	United	States,	3)	Do	the	
behaviors	and	attitudes	alter	after	returning	to	China	to	live,	and	if	so	are	they	more	
restrictive,	4)	It	there	a	difference	between	college	students	and	the	larger	adult	
population,	and	finally,	5)	Is	there	any	difference	between	those	users	who	can	use	
Facebook	in	China	from	those	who	can	not	and	only	use	RenRen.		Ideally,	these	
matters	would	be	considered	in	a	longitudinal	study	designed	to	learn	if	the	
behaviors	and	opinions	remain	the	same	or	change	over	time.				
	 I	noted	that	only	Participant	five,	who	has	been	in	the	country	two	years	
longer	than	the	only	sophomore	and	three	years	longer	than	the	three	freshmen,	
provided	a	number	of	answers	“closer”	to	the	expected	responses,	but	this	study	did	
not	develop	any	information	to	consider	what	motivations	and	beliefs	might	account	
for	this	fact.		It	would	be	interesting	to	learn	if	the	behaviors	and	opinions	of	the	
other	four	students	changed	and	more	closely	matched	Participant	five	now.
	 Regarding	my	survey	results	and	future	projections,	I	do	not	believe	the	data	
obtained	lets	me	make	definitive	conclusions	and	statements,	nor	to	suggest	that	the	
results	would	extend	beyond	this	particular	research	project.			I	think	that	the	
strongest	conclusion	that	can	now	be	cited	is	that	there	does	not	appear	to	be	any	
meaningful	difference	or	change	in	how	these	respondent	Chinese	students	are	
influenced	as	users	regardless	of	country.		Production	of	contrasting	and	conflicting	
answers	to	similar	questions,	insufficient	data,	including	failure	to	provide	
requested	reasons	to	specific	questions,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	similar	questions	
received	apparently	contradictory	and	conflicting	answers,	impaired	the	assessment	
results.	
	 In	summary,	this	survey	failed	to	provide	the	type	of	results	that	would	
enable	me	to	assert	that	particular	question	results	produced	clean	and	
unambiguous	findings	that	clarified	the	research	question.		The	findings	I	could	
discern,	as	reviewed	in	detail	in	the	assessment	portion	of	this	report,	were	
somewhat	unexpected,	and	refuted	the	hypothesis	that	the	Chinese	student	online	
user	behavior	on	the	SNS	(Facebook)	in	this	country	would	be	different,	more	open	
and	more	expressive	that	it	was	on	an	SNS	(RenRen)	in	China.		
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APPENDICES		
1.	When	did	you	arrive	at	Union	College?					Month:	________					Year:______________	
	
2.	How	long	will	you	be	studying	at	Union?	
	Short	term	___________			One	year__________					Four	years____________			Other______	
	
3.	What	grade	are	you	in?				
Freshman________		Sophomore_______		Junior___________		Senior__________	
	
4.	Age?	____	
	
5.		Were	you	a	user	of	the	Chinese	Social	Network	Site	RenRen,	prior	to	coming	to	
The	United	States	as	an	international	college	student	studying	abroad?	
	
	 No	_____	 Yes			_______	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
6.		How	did/do	you	primary	use	RenRen?		(Select	all	that	apply)	
	 To	expand	your	social	network	and	make	new	friends	_______	
	 Gather	information	about	friends	and	events	_______	
	 Share	information	and	express	myself	to	friends	_________	
	 To	easily	communicate	electronically	with	select	groups	of	friends_______	
	 Other:_________________________________________________________________________________	
	
7.	Do	you	continue	to	use	RenRen	while	in	the	U.S.	
Yes_____			No_______	
	
8.		After	living	in	The	United	States	do	you	still	use	RenRen	the	same	amount	you	did	
prior	coming	to	The	United	States.	
More	________				Less_________			The	same__________	
	
	
9.	Were	you	able	to	use	Facebook	in	China?	
Yes	________					No_________	
	
10.	Have	you	become	a	user	of	the	social	network	Facebook,	since	coming	to	The	
United	States	as	an	International	college	student?	
	
Yes______	
	
No_____	 Explain	why	you	decided	not	to	join	and	end	the	survey.	
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
11.	What	was	your	primary	reason	for	joining	Facebook?	(Check	one	answer)	
	 To	expand	your	social	network	and	make	new	friends	_______	
	 Gather	information	about	friends	and	events	_______	
	 Share	information	and	express	myself	to	friends	_________	
	 To	easily	communicate	electronically	with	select	groups	of	friends_______	
	 Because	this	is	how	American	college	students	communicate	_________	
	 Other:_________________________________________________________________________________		
	
	
12.	On	average	how	often	do	you	visit	Facebook?	
	 Less	than	weekly______	
	 	Weekly	________	
	 2	to	3	times	a	week	_______	 	
	 Daily	if	not	more	often	__________	
	
	
13.	How	do	you	use	Facebook?	(Check	all	the	apply)	
	 To	expand	your	social	network	and	make	new	friends	_______	
	 Gather	information	about	friends	and	events	_______	
	 Share	information	and	express	myself	to	friends	_________	
	 To	easily	communicate	electronically	with	select	groups	of	friends_______	
	 Other:_________________________________________________________________________________		
	
	
14.	Research	has	shown	that	the	overwhelming	majority	of	Facebook	users	in	The	
United	States	openly	share	personal	information	with	on‐line	friends	and	rely	upon	
the	network	privacy	setting	tools	to	restrict	non‐authorized	access.			How	do	you	
primarily	control	the	degree	of	personal	information	you	disclose?	
	 As	a	personal	rule,	I	don’t	disclose	personal	information	(Self‐Imposed	
Restrictions)		________					
	 I	use	the	Default	(standard)	automatic	privacy	settings	___________	
	 I	make	changes	and	customize	the	privacy	settings	to	meet	my	needs	_________	
	 	
	
15.	Does	governmental	control	of	a	social	networking	service(s)	influence	your	
decision	whether	or	not	you	disclose	your	personal	information?	
	 No_______	 Yes_______	
	
16.	There	is	no	governmental	censorship	of	Facebook	postings	in	The	United	States.		
Does	this	fact	influence	how	you	function	as	a	Facebook	user?	
	 No________	 Yes_______	
	 	 I	share	more	personal	information	and	data_____	
	 	 I	use	FB	more	frequently	than	I	did	RenRen	to	communicate____		
	 	 I	am	more	open	to	accepting	and	requesting	friend	requests____	
	 	 	 	
17.	Does	your	method	of	selecting	friends	on	RenRen	differ	from	how	you	choose	
friends	on	Facebook?	
	 No______	 Yes_______	
	 	 I	accept	requests	from	fellow	students	I	have	met_________	
	 	 I	accept	requests	from	all	Union	college	students_________	
	 	 I	use	Facebook	to	“meet”	and	communicate	with	new	friends_________	
		
	
18.	Research	has	suggested	that	cultural	collectivism	influences	Chinese	people	to	
value	group	orientation	over	individual	expression,	and	that	self‐discipline	is	
practiced	to	restrict	the	degree	of	personal	information	disclosed.	Do	you	agree	
cultural	influences	cause	you	to	restrict	the	amount	of	personal	identifiable	
information	you	make	available	on‐line?			
	 No________	 Yes_________	
	
	
19.	Do	you	think	that	you	have	experienced	change	and	now	share	“more”	
information	on	Facebook	than	you	did	previously?			
	 No_______	 Yes_______	
	If	you	now	share	more	information	what	factors	contributed	to	this	change?	
___________________________________________________________________________________________	
____________________________________________________________________________________________	
	
20.	Do	you	think	if	Facebook	were	available	in	China	and	operated	in	the	same	
manner	as	the	United	States,	including	no	governmental	control	or	censorship,	that	
Chinese	users	would	share	more	personal	information	and	communicate	more	
openly	on‐line?	
	 No_____	 Yes	_______		
	
	 	 	 	
21.	Do	you	think	RenRen	and	Facebook	basically	serve	the	same	function?	
Yes	_________			No_________	
If	No,	state	the	difference:	
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________________________________	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	ABSTRACT	
	 Research	regarding	Chinese	online	population	behaviors	on	the	Internet	is	
limited.		Social	Networking	Systems,	such	as	RenRen	(“China’s	Facebook”)	and	
Facebook,	continue	to	become	more	prevalent	in	our	world’s	society	and	afford	
individuals	opportunities	to	publish	and	share	personal	information	with	others	
online.	This	study	investigates	the	on‐line	habits	of	Chinese	students	who	have	been	
living	and	studying	at	Union	College	for	at	least	six	months,	and	compares	their	
primary	usage	of	the	networks	RenRen	and	Facebook.	This	research	provides	
preliminary	results	concerning	how	the	respondents	feel	regarding	the	combination	
of	American	cultural	influence	and	greater	“freedom	of	expression”	afforded	to	
Facebook	SNS	users,	how	this	affect	and	changes	their	online	behavior(s).	These	
students	come	from	a	society	that	focuses	on	community	and	collectivism,	as	
opposed	to	individual	pursuits,	but	Internet	communications	create	more	of	a	focus	
on	the	individual	through	social	networks,	even	in	China.	The	Chinese	government	
monitors	and	censors	all	online	media	content.	This	study	questions	how	Chinese	
students,	who	have	functioned	in	a	society	that	expects	self‐imposed	restrictions,	
behave	once	they	are	immersed	in	an	environment	where	they	can	openly	express	
themselves	without	state	censorship.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
	
	
	
	
